Reorganization under the Federal Statutes - Chapter X of the Chandler Act by Swanstrom, Luther D.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 17 Issue 1 Article 2 
December 1938 
Reorganization under the Federal Statutes - Chapter X of the 
Chandler Act 
Luther D. Swanstrom 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Luther D. Swanstrom, Reorganization under the Federal Statutes - Chapter X of the Chandler Act, 17 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1 (1938). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol17/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 




VOL. 17 DECEMBER, 1938 No. I
REORGANIZATION UNDER THE FEDERAL STATUTES *
CHAPTER X OF THE CHANDLER ACT
LUTHER D. SWANSTROMt
H ISTORY begins with trade, and the story of the debtor and
his creditor appears on the first page. This true story is an ab-
sorbing one. It abounds in pathos and intrigue. It recounts the
suffering of the innocent unfortunates and their eventual rescue,
the frauds of the villainous and their inevitable punishment.
Rigorous punishment for nonpayment of debts is recorded-
death penalties, commitment into bondage and seizure of all the
debtor's goods and chattels with the debtor still weighted down
by deficiencies. Then the concept changes and severity relaxes.
The debtor is discharged from his debts upon surrender of all his
property. Later, he is allowed his homestead and tools as ex-
empt. Finally, under the aegis of the bankruptcy power, relief
is extended for the reorganization of a debtor, to salvage his busi-
ness for social good, and to protect the creditor from the wastage
of liquidation.
DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY LAws
Lifting the veil of antiquity, we discover that the first relief
statute for an innocent debtor, caught in the "fell clutch of cir-
cumstance," appears on stone tablets carved by Hammurabi in
the twenty-third century before Christ: "If any one owe a debt
for a loan, and a storm prostrates the grain, or the harvest fail,
or the grain does not grow for lack of water; in that year he
need not give his creditor any grain, he washes his debt tablet
0 Speech given Dec. 9, 1938, before Nordic Law Club of Chicago.
t Member, firm of Johnson, Swanstrom & Wiles; author, Chapter X - Corporate
Reorganization Under the Federal Statute (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1938).
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[a symbolical action indicating the inability to pay] and pays no
rent for this year."'
The biblical debt relief, known as "The Lord's Release," pro-
vided for the discharge of debts among the Jews every seventh
year. This statute did not apply to foreigners. It was to be
effective "save when there shall be no poor among you."2 Ap-
parently the relief afforded by the mandatory release of debts
has not produced the condition subsequent that expressly limits
the term during which the statute shall be effective, for the poor
have been ever with us.
About eighteen hundred years after the date of the code of
Hammurabi, Solon removed the mortgage pillars that covered
most of the land of Greece and so granted relief from secured
debts. He freed those in slavery for debt, and forbade contracts
that put a debtor, his children, or dependent relatives into bond-
age by reason of debt. In Rome, the idea that punishment should
follow debt default gradually gave way and was tempered to
allow the redemption of debt slaves upon the posting of a bond,
with a relative as surety.
In England, with the growth of the law merchant, there de-
veloped the notion of a general execution in favor of creditors of
debtors engaged in certain businesses. The bankruptcy law, how-
ever, developed slowly. At the time our Constitution was adopted
the English law recognized only the interests of the creditors and
proceeded on the assumption that the debtor was necessarily to
be dealt with as a wrongdoer. Voluntary bankruptcy was then
unknown to that system, and only traders were permitted to fall
within the term "bankrupt."
In this country the development of the law has been gradual.
Bankruptcy legislation was usually enacted either during, or
immediately subsequent to, the several periods when economic
stress reached panic proportions. Each act was intended to fur-
nish remedies for the most apparent defects in the economic
system or from speculative excesses prevalent in a fast growing
country. Hence, each succeeding law advanced beyond its pred-
ecessor in the relief afforded and the persons and subjects
encompassed. Congress has passed four distinct bankruptcy laws,
and many amendments, including the Chandler Act of 1938,
which is a comprehensive revision as well as an amendment.
I Great Events by Famous Historians, Vol. I, p. 21. 2 Deut. 15:1-4.
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The first bankruptcy law, that of 1800, advanced beyond the
then existing English law by including not only traders but also
bankers, brokers, and underwriters. The second, that of 1841,
made a further forward step by allowing voluntary petitions,
thus recognizing that a debtor might be unfortunate and yet not
an offender. The third law, that of 1867, with its amendment of
1874, permitted compositions before or after adjudication, and
thus afforded a certain percentage of creditors the right, in
agreement with the debtor, to abort the bankruptcy proceeding
and yet provide a discharge upon agreed terms. This concept
underlies the composition and reorganization sections, beginning
with section 74 of 1933, which were passed as amendments to our
fourth bankruptcy law, that of 1898.
The Chandler Act does not affect certain sections of Chapter
VIII: Section 75, dealing with agricultural compositions and ex-
tensions; Section 77, dealing with reorganization of railroads
engaged in interstate commerce; and Section 81, now Chapter IX,
dealing with readjustment of debts of taxing districts.
The draftsmanship of the Chandler Act is an improvement
over the old law by reason of a changed grouping whereby re-
lated parts are more logically arranged; certain ambiguities and
contradictions have been removed, as have also many of the per-
plexities in appeals; and the provisions relating to participation
in hearings and to compensation have been amplified. Generally,
however, Chapter X embodies the provisions of 77B and codifies
much of the case law developed under that section.
Chapter XI permits, by voluntary petition of any person who
could become a bankrupt under Section 4 thereof, the making of
arrangements affecting unsecured debts. Chapter XII permits,
by voluntary petition of persons other than corporations, real
property arrangements. While a petition under Chapter XII must
have as its primary object the readjustment of secured claims,
unsecured debts may be treated. A complete reorganization of
the debt structure of an individual, including liens, may now be
accomplished under this chapter. Much of the case law developed
under Section 77B will be applicable under Chapter XII. It is
worthy of note that the report of the Committee on the Judiciary
states that it is expected that Chapter XII will afford necessary
remedies for conditions arising in the Chicago metropolitan area
growing out of the practice of real estate financing by bond issues
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Chapter XIII deals with wage earners' plans and embodies a new
concept in that future earnings may be brought within the control
of the court. Chapter XIV deals with maritime liens.
The technique employed in legislating on reorganization has
been to superimpose a code on the fundamental bankruptcy power
and the jurisprudence developed in general equity. With certain
excepted sections, Chapters I to VII inclusive of the old Bank-
ruptcy Act, and the equity jurisprudence are carried forward by
reference, hedged, however, by the qualification that the pro-
visions or rules from such fields shall not apply in the code for
reorganization if they are inconsistent or in conflict with the
provisions of the particular reorganization chapter. This method
of legislating gives rise to serious problems of interpretation. The
provisions of Chapter X apply, however, exclusively to proceed-
ings under that chapter. This is true also with respect to Chapters
XI, XII, and XIII.
The reorganization statutes were passed to afford greater and
more comprehensive relief in debtor and creditor problems than
was obtainable in ordinary bankruptcy or equity receivership.
While a proceeding under Chapter X is a proceeding in bank-
ruptcy, it is not an ordinary bankruptcy, for its objective is
different, and it stops short of liquidation sale and the distribution
of cash dividends-its goal is rehabilitation and therefore permits
payment in securities. Neither is it the equivalent of an equity
receivership; rather it is a hybrid of bankruptcy administration
and equity jurisprudence, and a step beyond each.
Chapter X is but one segment in a great body of Federal
statutory reorganization law. It contains some advanced social-
economic concepts, the wisdom of certain of which only time and
practice can definitely test. It appears that the estate of the
debtor passes not only into custodia legis as formerly, but, under
this new law it also falls into the radius of custodia regis. Private
contracts and the reorganization of business corporations have
apparently become the especial concern of the state. General
public interest is presumed to be advanced by the gratuitous and
voluntary protection afforded investors and other creditors
through the participation in, and the censorship of, the proceed-
ings by a governmental agency, the Securities and Exchange
Commission.3 Certain classes of society, such as labor organiza-
8 Chapter X, sec. 172.
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tions with no property interest except possibly that of individual
economic weal for the class, may partake in the reorganization of
a distressed debtor-employer by advancing ideas as to the eco-
nomic soundness of a plan.4 The motives and purposes of non-
acceptors, as well as acceptors of a plan, are subject to judicial
inquiry with the possible disqualification as voters for lack of
good faith.' Intermittent refunding of debt is discouraged and
eventual payment is required.' Forthright and nonpartisan rep-
resentation is expected to result from provisions that search out
impurity of motives which might actuate agents and committees,
and that set up disciplinary measures as safeguards. 7 Self-interest
is stifled by mandatory disinterested trusteeship even at the ex-
pense of pride of ownership.8 Only time and practice can demon-
strate whether these provisions will achieve the desired end with-
out too great a sacrifice of property rights and substantial values.
INTERPRETATION
The interpretation and application of the statute should be
made with regard for its historical background, the legal con-
cepts from which it springs, and its purposes and the ultimate
objectives sought to be achieved, as well as the evils it seeks to
end. Creditors give up their old remedies with reluctance; yet,
when additional remedies are afforded they must be given effect
when invoked. The amelioration of the situation of the oppressed
debtor is, however, necessarily slow in development in order
that a proper check may be made on the debt evaders and that
a vitality may be preserved in contracts for the protection of
trade and commerce.
The bankruptcy remedial amendments since 1933 have laid the
foundation for the creation of a permanent body of case law.
This development can best be traced and understood by examina-
tion of all the opinions of the several courts with regard to the
date of each opinion and the locale of the proceeding. The several
metropolitan centers produce their peculiar problems and develop
their own individual solutions to such problems. So the various
sections of the country, with great regional diversification of its
industries and commercial activities, may solve their problems
with varying degrees of uniformity. In recognition of these chang-
4 Ibid., sec. 206. 5 Ibid., sec. 203. 6 Ibid., sec. 216(9).
7 Ibid., secs. 211, 213, 249. 8 Ibid., sec. 156.
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ing and variable factors, the reorganization amendments to the
bankruptcy law are devised to leave to the discretion of the judge
the final determination of the most important matters arising in
the administration of the law, the administration of which is of
equal importance to the law itself.
POWER
The source of the Congressional power to enact bankruptcy
laws is in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. To understand
better the extent of this power, one must keep in mind the his-
tory of its exercise by progressive extension to wider and wider
fields as well as the judicial interpretation of the various laws
on the subject which defines the power.
Congress responded to the present depression, drawing more
fully upon the latent bankruptcy power to furnish relief in the
debtor-creditor relationship, by providing mechanics for reorgan-
ization. This has been held not to be an unconstitutional exercise
of the power. The power has not been enlarged; it was always
there. Its greater use has given it animation to function as
needed. It must be expected that the growth of commercial
relations, bringing practical business problems into the life of
almost every individual, will find the facilities and mechanics of
the old bankruptcy laws insufficient to meet the requirements of
the debtor and creditor readjustment which necessarily follows.
It is now recognized that once a person is found to be insol-
vent in the absolute or limited sense, Congress has paramount
jurisdiction under the bankruptcy power to provide for the sale
of his assets, or for reorganization and the readjustment of the
debt structure. Every aspect of the affairs of an insolvent person
can be dealt with under the power subject only to Constitutional
limitations.
Limitations on the bankruptcy power are not specially enumer-
ated in the Constitution. It is definitely established now that the
power is not measured or limited by the English law as it existed
at the time our Federal Constitution was adopted, and that
adjudication and liquidation are not essential to jurisdiction.9
The power is, however, subject to the Fifth Amendment, which
requires due process of law when property is to be taken from
9 Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.
Co., 294 U.S. 648, 55 S. Ct. 595, 79 L. Ed. 1110 (1935).
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any person. But due process is a flexible term whose definition
lies in the last analysis in judicial temperament and background.
So also the concept of bankruptcy changes. 10
Our dual system of government gives rise to serious discussions
in the field of bankruptcy law. States may legislate on the subject
within the limits of the state and Federal constitutions. Such
legislation, however, is suspended during the time that there
exists a national bankruptcy.law insofar as such state laws are in
actual conflict with the Federal law."
The state creates corporations and limits their existence, but
the state classification of corporations, such as insurance and
banking, does not prevent a bankruptcy court from deciding
whether or not as a matter of fact a certain corporation is amen-
able to bankruptcy, as whether it falls within or without the
excepted class in the bankruptcy law.'2 So also the reorganized
corporation cannot be incorporated except in conformity with
the state laws of its incorporation. Congress has recognized that
a state may make reasonable regulations relating to the opera-
tions of a business charged with great public interest, such as a
public utility, and has provided in the bankruptcy law for ap-
proval of plans of such debtors by the commissions regulating
such utilities.13 The bankruptcy courts generally recognize and
follow the state law in determination both of property rights and
of questions of general commercial law.14 Yet the bankruptcy law
may give a landlord a remedy against the estate not afforded by
the state law.'" The validity of state taxes may be determined by
the bankruptcy court and payment directed. State court decrees
and judgments are generally recognized, but their effect in the
bankruptcy estate is controlled by the Bankruptcy Act. Where
the state court judgment is for fees in foreclosure cases, there
must be a direction to pay; otherwise, the bankruptcy court re-
examines the value of the services and the amount of the allow-
10 Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 58 S. Ct. 1025, 82 L. Ed.
1490 (1938).
11 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 58 S. Ct.
125, 82 L. Ed. 147 (1937).
12 In re Prudence Co., Inc., 79 F. (2d) 77 (1935).
18 Chapter X, secs. 177, 178.
14 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114
A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
15 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 57 S. Ct.
292, 81 L. Ed. 324 (1937).
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ance. 6 Property rights as established by state law may be
modified by bankruptcy law; for example, the period set by state
statute within which property may be redeemed in foreclosure
may be prolonged by bankruptcy law.
17
The bankruptcy court has the power with which it is invested
by Congress. The Bankruptcy Act must be examined to see if the
power or jurisdiction has been granted in all instances where
the question of jurisdiction arises. If jurisdiction is granted, it is
paramount. In reorganization, jurisdiction is extended to cover
every person and thing that can be brought into the radius of the
debtor and creditor relationship.
Express limitations on the bankruptcy court are found in the
Act. Such limitations do not follow necessarily by reason of lack
of congressional power, but from lack of exercise of the power.,
For example, Section 23 provides that, with certain exceptions,
suits by the receiver or trustee shall be brought only in the court
where the bankrupt might have sued if there had been no bank-
ruptcy, unless by the consent of the defendant. By reason of this,
plenary suits are required in controversies unless the defendant
submits to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. This rule was
followed in Section 77B cases.' 9 Chapter X expressly makes Sec-
tion 23 inapplicable, but Chapter XII does not. The courts must
decide the limit, therefore, of their jurisdiction in these particu-
lars under the present law.
The law, as respects due process and state sovereignty, is not
precisely defined. The state of flux found here is demonstrated by
two recent decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting Section
80, dealing with readjustments of municipal debts. In May, 1936,
the court held the section unconstitutional, and in April, 1938, it
held the revised section constitutional. The rationale in the two
opinions is not in harmony. There was a shift in the personnel of
the court. Mr. Justice McReynolds wrote the opinion in the first
case, with Justices Hughes, Cardozo, and Stone dissenting; the
16 Shulman v. Wilson-Sheridan Hotel Co., 301 U.S. 172, 57 S. Ct. 680, 81 L. Ed.
986 (1937), rehearing den., 301 U.S. 714, 57 S. Ct. 921, 81 L. Ed. 1365 (1937).
17 Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 58 S. Ct. 1025, 82 L. Ed.
1490 (1938).
18 Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiiler Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 44 S. Ct. 396, 68 L. Ed.
770 (1924).
19 In re Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 86 F. (2d) 508 (1936); In re Prima Co.,
98 F. (2d) 952 (1938), in which the court said that not to apply the rule would
constitute a repeal of sec. 23 insofar as reorganization matters are concerned.
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opinion in the other case was by Chief Justice Hughes, with
Justices McReynolds and Butler dissenting. In the first case,20
the court said that the law restricted the control of the State over
its fiscal affairs; that state sovereignty cannot be surrendered;
that the consent of the State cannot enlarge the powers of
Congress. In the second case, 21 the court stated that the State had
consented; that States may consent to contracts which do not
contravene the Federal Constitution; that ability to make con-
tracts is the essence of sovereignty; and finally, that by co-
operation of the state and Federal governments the only remedy
possible could be afforded.
INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS
The amenability of the debtor organization is determined by
the bankruptcy law. To come under Chapter X the organization
must be a corporation as defined in the Act. Questions relating
to eligibility of unincorporated bodies, newly organized corpora-
tions, excepted corporations and subsidiaries will not be discussed.
Proceedings may be initiated by petition of the debtor or of
three or more creditors having claims against the debtor, or
against its property, amounting to at least $5000, or by the
indenture trustee.22 The petition may be answered or contro-
verted by the debtor, by any creditor, by the indenture trustee,
and by any stockholder if the debtor is not found to be insol-
vent.23 The requirement of Section 77B for group action is
dropped from Chapter X.
The venue is determined by the location of the debtor's principal
place of business or its principal assets.24 The provision of Section
77B permitting the filing of a petition in any district in the state
of incorporation is dropped from Chapter X. Proceedings may be
transferred to such place as will best subserve the interests of
the parties without regard to the location of the assets or office.25
The necessary allegations of the petition are prescribed
categorically. 28 To overcome the effect of the Duparquet de-
cision,27 which held that a foreclosure receivership was not the
20 Ashton v. Cameron, 298 U. S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892, 80 L. Ed. 1309 (1936).
21 United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27, 58 S. Ct. 811, 82 L. Ed. 1137 (1938),
rehearing den. 304 U. S. 589, 58 S. Ct. 1043, 1044, 82 L. Ed. 1549 (1938).
22 Chapter X, sec. 126. 23 Ibid., secs. 136, 137. 24 Ibid., sec. 128.
25 Ibid., sec. 118. 26 Ibid., secs. 130, 131.
27 Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U. S. 216, 56 S. Ct. 412,
80 L. Ed. 591 (1936).
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equivalent of a general "equity receivership," Chapter X ex-
pressly excuses the allegation of an act of bankruptcy if all or
the greater part of the debtor's property is affected by trustee
possession by reason of default, by appointment of a receiver or
trustee, or by a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage or lien. The
jurisdictional facts required by the chapter must be alleged and
these facts must be such that when they have been determined
by the court for the exercise of its jurisdiction, the judgment
cannot be attacked collaterally.
The statute creates the jurisdiction of the court, and while a
court may not extend its jurisdiction beyond the statute, it has
the power to interpret the language of the statute and its applica-
tion to an issue before it. It has the power to determine whether or
not it has jurisdiction. This is the principle upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests which puts an end to litigation. A
difference is recognized between strictly jurisdictional facts, the
absence of which renders a judgment void, and quasi jurisdiction-
al facts which are necessary to be alleged and proved in order
to set the machinery of the law in motion. Examples of the
former are the appointment of an administrator for a living
person, or the adjudication of an insurance company as a bank-
rupt. Examples of the latter are the insufficiency of personal
property to pay debts of a decedent when application is made to
sell the real estate, or that an alleged bankrupt is a farmer.
The requirement of good faith has been retained in Chapter X.
While Chapter XII does not expressly require good faith in the
filing of the petition, the arrangement will not be confirmed unless
it is made and accepted in good faith and a proposal must
accompany the petition. Furthermore, "clean hands" must be
present since the proceedings are essentially in equity. "Good
faith" is not defined, although Section 146 specifies when good
faith is lacking. This is but a restatement of the principles
established in Section 77B cases. Good faith cannot be com-
prehensively defined. It connotes honesty, actuality, innocence,
and absence of fraud, collusion, or deceit. It has been given a
practical meaning, so that a possibility of reorganization must be
thought to exist or good faith will be lacking. Mere "visionary or
impracticable schemes of rehabilitations" 8 do not connote good
28 Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American Nat. Bank. 299 U. S. 18, 57 S. Ct. 85.
81 L. Ed. 13 (1936)
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faith. It is not, however, a mere formal concept demanding
strict adherence without regard to the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. It is not an evidential fact to be al-
leged in the petition; it is an ultimate fact to be found by the
court from the evidential facts. It is a conclusion to be drawn,
one way or the other, from the facts appearing in the petition, or
appearing elsewhere or otherwise.
Representation by committees, agents or attorneys in the
proceedings, though authorized, is especially scrutinized." The
provision requiring a showing that there has been compliance
with all applicable law relating to such persons is significant."
Procedural questions arising after the approval of a petition, or
of the powers of the court, or of jurisdictional questions will not
be discussed. But attention is called to the new provisions relating
to the rights of the indenture trustee; the Securities and
Exchange Commission; the mandatory provision for the appoint-
ment of a trustee where the scheduled indebtedness is $250,000
or more;"' and the new duties of the trustee, among which is the
preparation of the plan and its proposal; 2 the reference of the
plan to the Securities and Exchange Commission"3 and its appro-
val by the court before submission to the parties in interest;
4
the invalidation of acceptances solicited prior to such approval,85
provisions that no gain is realized for income tax purposes by the
cancellation or forgiveness of debts in reorganization;"6 and the
inequitable, if not absurd, provision limiting the determination
of the "bases" which effectually penalizes creditors for taking a
loss on claims in that it reduces the exemptions for depreciation. 7
ADMINISTRATION
Administration is the fulcrum of the proceedings upon which is
balanced the readjustment of the rights and equities of the
actual parties in interest. The difference between administering
an estate for reorganization instead of for liquidation is apparent.
This real difference is preserved, or lost, mainly by the kind of
administration to which the estate is subjected. The nature or
quality of the administration of the debtor's business is most vital
to creditors and stockholders working toward reorganization.
29 Chapter X, sec. 211. 80 Ibid., sec. 213. 81 Ibid., sec., 156.
S2 Ibid., sec. 169. 3 Ibid., sec. 172. 84 Ibid., secs. 173, 174.
85 Ibid., sec. 176. 86 Ibid., sec. 268. 37 Ibid., sec. 270.
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The keynote of administration is the preservation and conserva-
tion of the debtor's business, good will and other assets, and the
continuation of its business, and to insure these interests certif-
icates of indebtedness may be issued.8 These are the underlying
principles in the cases. The affairs and assets of the debtor should
be brought under one jurisdiction as promptly as possible and
with no more interruption or disturbance of the regular prosecu-
tion of the debtor's business than is necessary, in order that the
momentum of the business be not impeded and that all potential-
ities of reorganization may be preserved.
Normally the objective of the proceeding is not punitive, nor is
the proceeding brought for the main purpose of investigation.
The response, therefore, to the statutory emphasis in this re-
spect 39 must be made in the exercise of good judgment to avoid
lengthening unnecessarily the period of administration. It is com-
mon experience that acute financial distress of a debtor cannot
be made chronic by over-prolonged court proceedings, without
harm to all interested parties.
The debtor may be continued in possession in the interest of
economy and preservation of the elusive good will that attaches
itself to business. The status of the debtor in possession has been
rather fully discussed. Without more, it may be said that what-
ever that status may be in respect of any particular matter, it is
at least the status of a receiver. This unique method in sequestra-
tion proceedings was used extensively in 77B cases. Under
Chapter X, however, a trustee must be appointed where the
scheduled debts aggregate $250,000 or more. This provision has
been subjected to much criticism. Certainly the field of judicial
discretion should be extended to cases where the claims ag-
gregate at least $1,000,000.
The trustee and his attorney must be disinterested. 0 The
trustee is charged with many new functions under Chapter X.
It is a concept of this chapter that he shall serve as the focal
point for the formulation and negotiation of the plan of reor-
ganization. He shall investigate the affairs of the corporation,
and prepare informative documents for the use of the parties in
interest and of the court. Somewhat similar duties fall upon the
debtor when it is continued in possession, but under such cir-
88 In re Prima Co., 88 F. (2d) 785 (1937); Chapter X, sec. 116(2).
89 Chapter X, sec. 167. 40 Ibid., secs. 156, 157.
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cumstances the court may appoint an examiner to perform
certain special duties of a trustee.41
STOCKHOLDERS' TREATMENT
Stockholders, of course, are vitally concerned with the ques-
tion of the solvency or insolvency of the debtor because its
financial condition may determine their participation in the pro-
ceedings and the plan. If the debtor is not insolvent, any stock-
holder may file an answer controverting the allegations of the
original petition.42 Where the debtor is continued in possession,
any stockholder may file a plan if the debtor is found not to be
insolvent48 and acceptances by or on behalf of stockholders hold-
ing the majority of the stock, of which proofs of each class
have been filed and allowed, are required." No protection need
be provided in the plan for a class of stockholders of which
the necessary majority has failed to accept if the judge shall
determine that the debtor is insolvent.45 Apparently stockholders
have the right to be heard in all matters arising in a proceeding
regardless of the solvency or insolvency of the debtor.46
Since a solvent corporation may file a petition in bankruptcy
it may be questioned whether or not an adjudication in a super-
seded proceeding is conclusive on the question of solvency or
insolvency in the reorganization proceedings. To determine the
status of solvency and insolvency, consideration of various fac-
tors is necessary, such as cost, reproduction cost, and use value.
Recent sales of property similar to that of the debtor and the
expected service life of the property have been considered.
Fair rental value of the property is an important element. The
Supreme Court has stated, however, that estimates of rental
values during eras of depression are quite unreliable.4 Audits
and appraisals of expert appraisers are customarily used. The
value of the whole undertaking as a going concern should be
determined.
No standardization of methods can be established to control
without exception in every case. In a period of general national
distress, markets become glutted and cannot absorb the proper-
ties offered even at private sale by reason of the potential fore-
41 Ibid., sec. 168. 42 Ibid., sec. 137. 48 Ibid., sec. 170.
44 Ibid., sec. 179. 45 Ibid., sec. 216(8). 46 Ibid., sec. 206.
47 Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S. 445, 57 S. Ct. 298, 81 L. Ed. 340 (1937).
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closure sales overhanging the market. The appraisement of
personal property such as stocks, bonds, and commodities that
normally have a stable market value may not be possible during
certain periods, reoccurring apparently in uncomfortably short
intervals, by reason of the erratic and spasmodic behavior of
the stock and commodity markets. The necessary protection
against price fluctuations, both for the borrower and the lender,
must be found in the methods that the court will use in any
particular case for the appraisement of the value of the debtor's
assets.
REORGANIZATION
Reorganization is readjustment and is essentially a business
problem. It requires a frank approach to the realities in each
case and a recognition that a compromise of rights and equities
is inevitable. The objective of a proceeding under Chapter X is
to effectuate a reorganization and to launch the debtor or its
successor into business free and clear of stockholders' interests
and creditors' claims, including tort claims and landlord's claims,
except as they may be reserved in the plan or in the order
confirming the plan.
The objective is not so much to change present contracts
as to reform them, in order not only to relieve the debtor, but
also to provide relief for its creditors; to remove conditions
that have by the turn of events become so onerous that the
debtor's business furnishes no yield to its creditors by payment
of principal or interest; and to extend maturities, reduce interest
or principal or both, or remove such of the conditions that
prevent the regular payments to creditors. This is the public
policy underlying Section 77B and Chapter X. It is not relief
for the debtor solely, or for its creditors only, since relief to
one is relief to the other.
Any scheme of reorganization which the imagination can con-
ceive is permissible providing it is not violative of the statute
or other law. The statute sets forth a catalog of requirements
of, and suggestions for, a plan.4" Certain of these are mandatory
and certain permissive. Chapter X re-enacts the 77B provisions,
but adds certain requirements such as the following: The manner
of selection of directors, officers or voting trustees and their
48 Chapter X, sec. 216.
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successors must be set out, and the provisions relating thereto
must be equitable and compatible with public interest; non-
voting stock is prohibited and the voting power must be fairly dis-
tributed; provisions must be made for sound accounting prac-
tice, and adequate and fair provisions respecting the redemption
of securities and the declaration of dividends; if the liquidated
liabilities equal $250,000 or more, provisions must be made for
at least annual reports to security holders, including profit and
loss statements and balance sheets.
Section 77B was used extensively as a method of foreclosing
liens expeditiously with the elimination of the equity of redemp-
tion. With the added provisions of Chapter XII permitting the
modification of mortgage liens in any manner, including the
sale of the property free from liens, creditors are provided with
convenient mechanics for realization of their claims even against
an individual holding mortgaged property.
It is only the property of the debtor that may be encompassed
by the reorganization. Hence, it has been held that a plan may
not release guarantors or the claims of creditors against third
persons for misrepresentation in the sale of securities. Claims
for mismanagement of the debtor's property may, however, be
released, for such release is a treatment of the debtor's prop-
erty. The Supreme Court has recently held, reversing the Illinois
Supreme Court, that if the order of confirmation releasing the
guarantor entered after contest is not appealed from in the
proceeding, it is binding on another court and the guarantor
may plead res judicata against such suit. This is an example
of a judgment that cannot be attacked collaterally. The reorgan-
ization court having determined the jurisdictional fact, another
court may not retry such fact.49
To use properly the term "property" regard must be had to
the statute and the connection in which it is found. 0 Not only
is the tangible thing property but also the right to use or operate
such a thing by franchise, grant or custom. It may mean either
the rights in the physical thing or the physical thing itself, or
both. Such is the good will developed by the business, the habit
of people to return to the same place to trade or to purchase
goods under a certain name.
49 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 59 S. Ct. 134, 83 L. Ed. Advance Opinions 116 (1938).
50 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Arenz, 290 U. S. 66, 54 S. Ct. 16, 78 L. Ed. 176 (1933).
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Written acceptances to the plan are required from creditors
of each class holding two-thirds of the amount of the claims
of such class, and of the majority of the capital stock of each
class, if the debtor is not found to be insolvent. If the United
States is a creditor, acceptances by the Secretary of the Treasury
is required unless payment in full is provided. Such acceptance
is presumed if the Secretary of the Treasury fails to act for
more than ninety days after receipt of notice and copy of the plan.
When an accepted plan is presented for confirmation, there
must appear compliance with all statutory requirements. There
must be a showing in the record of sufficient facts from which
the court can form an enlightened judgment and upon which
it can exercise its discretion whether or not to confirm the plan
as being fair, equitable and feasible.
Section 77B did not require court approval of a plan before
submission to creditors and stockholders. Chapter X does. Fur-
thermore, Chapter X prohibits solicitation of acceptances prior
to such approval without the consent of the court.5' Section 77B
recognized acceptances procured even prior to the filing of the
petition52 as does also Chapter XII.5' The emphasis is placed
upon the solicitation and therefore acceptances voluntarily given
before approval may be valid. At all events the court will have
to decide what amounts to solicitation. Apparently the intent is
to prohibit the practice of negotiating plans and testing their
acceptability before going into court. This is a limitation on the
freedom of private trading thought necessary to afford protection.
Only by actual practice can the profit or loss from this rule be
known.
The Supreme Court has not as yet passed upon the treatment
in an accepted plan of dissenting minorities of a participating
class. It has, however, approved the exclusion upon a basis of
appraisement of junior classes in the order of their rank by a
senior class for want of any equity after the senior class has
received satisfaction by appropriating the assets to itself.
5 4
While priorities between the respective classes are to be main-
tained as carefully as possible, a majority of the courts have
not followed the so-called strict priority rule adopted in equity
51 Chapter X, sec. 176. 52 Section 77B(e), 11 U. S. C. A. §207(e).
53 Chapter XII, sec. 436(4).
54 Re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U. S. 24, 57 S. Ct. 88, 81 L. Ed. 16 (1936).
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receivership cases after the Boyd decision.5 The courts have
often permitted the participation of junior interests and stock-
holders where it seemed practical and agreeable with the pur-
pose of the statute so to do, even though the relative priorities
were not strictly and to the last detail followed. Reasons ad-
vanced for this may be the necessity for compromises, the value
of the managerial skill, the personalities and their ability to
retain the good will, and the value of the debtor's organization
as a going concern. The doctrine of "de minimis" has likewise
been applied. In reorganization proceedings, potency of fact
surmounts authority of theory. Over-nice theories supported only
by technicalities blossom well in the library, but they must yield
to practical considerations dominant in the workshop and factory.
The court sitting in Chapter X proceedings is a court in bank-
ruptcy with a jurisdiction greater within the statute than that
of a court of equity, and has a jurisdiction extended beyond that
of a court sitting in strict bankruptcy.
Confusion may have been brought about in decisions by failure
to differentiate clearly between accepted and nonaccepted plans.
Furthermore, construction of vague and flexible statutory pro-
visions often creates judicial expressions that are merely dicta,
but which, because of their being euphonious, will be repeated
in inapplicable as well as applicable situations and thereby be-
come more or less authoritative. Such expressions as "com-
pletely compensatory" and "indubitable equivalents," used in
an early case56 in connection with a denial of a stay order against
a mortgagee, have attracted such repetition. Equitable equiv-
alents should be satisfactory, since realistically a demand for
complete compensation in money in full at the moment may be
futile. Such compensation is often found only in new securities
made good or redeemed from the fruits of the labor of the
debtor's managing stockholders.
The rule developed by the majority of the cases might be
stated as follows: Applied equity is not opposed to participation
in a common enterprise by junior interests on a parity with
senior interests in proportions found fair and just by the judge,
as guardian of the silent nonacceptors as well as the articulate
55 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931
(1913).
56 In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941 (1935).
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objectors, under the peculiar exigencies of each reorganization
problem, and when such participation does not result in op-
pression of minorities by accepting majorities.
There are provisions which make it possible for the court
to confirm a plan though the required percentage of accept-
ances may not have been obtained for an affected class, provided
adequate provision for the realization of the claims or interests
of such class is provided.57 These provisions are adopted from
Section 77B 58 A similar provision appears in the Railroad Act,
but with the requirement that such plan must also "conform to
the requirements of the law of the land." The provision for the
treatment of nonaccepting classes was used with indifferent
success under 77B. The sixth circuit held the provision (77B,b-
(5)) unconstitutional,59 but this holding was made dictum inas-
much as the Supreme Court, while affirming the decision insofar
as it dismissed the petition, held that the constitutional question
was not involved.60 The cases do not indicate that these statutory
provisions are unconstitutional but rather that the use to which
they may be put in a plan may make the plan unconstitutional.
"Realization" has been construed to imply that that which
was in prospect has come to hand. 1 Payment in cash of a claim
is perfect realization, but realization may be accomplished under
the provisions of Section 77B b(5). Security holders must, how-
ever, receive equitable equivalents for their security.2 The es-
sential thing is to give the mortgagee the benefit of the value
of his securities.6
If the holders of claims or stock have, in bad faith, accepted
or failed to accept a plan, the court is permitted under Section
203 of Chapter X to disqualify them from voting, and such
claims are not computed in determining the requisite majority
for the acceptance of the plan. The net effect of this provision,
it seems, would be to lend flexibility to the fixed percentages
required by Section 179; so Section 203 may be employed for
57 Chapter X, sec. 216 (7&8).
58 Section 77B(b), clauses (4) and (5), 11 U. S. C. A. §207(b).
59 In re Tennessee Pub. Co., 81 F. (2d) 463 (1936).
60 Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American Nat. Bank, 299 U. S. 18, 57 S. Ct. 85,
81 L. Ed. 13 (1936).
61 Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco Dev. Co., 87 F. (2d) 395 (1936),
reh. den. (1937).
62 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 16 F. Supp. 504 (1936).
68 In re Witherbee Court Corp., 88 F. (2d)251 (1937).
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effectuation of a plan where less than the required acceptances
of a class are obtained. The latter emergency is met by clauses
7 and 8 of Section 216, which are incorporated to produce the
result of an accepted plan. There is no magic in the 67 per cent
and the 51 per cent, for Congress might have used some other
percentages. There was no provision similar to Section 203 in
Section 77B, and the provision thereof which required with ac-
ceptances verified statements relating to the claims purchased
or transferred during or in contemplation of the proceedings
was held not to extend to requiring investigation of the motives
of nonacceptors.
ALLOWANCES
The amount of fees to be allowed is left to the discretion of
the judge. The category of the persons who, under Chapter X,
may be compensated has been enlarged over the comparable
provisions in 77B, as has also the nature of the activities that
are compensable. Generally speaking, except for court officers
as such, services to be compensable must go directly to the
execution of the plan and to the advancement of the proceedings
and its successful consummation. In practice the fundamentals
of a plan are often negotiated and formulated before going to
court. Such services have been held compensable.
The services that merely duplicate those performed by other
persons who are charged with the duty to represent the interests
so served are not usually compensatory. While adversary position
is the essence of the debtor and creditor relationship, and does
not of itself preclude compensation, yet parties who indulge in
cantankerous tactics and litigiousness merely for their own sakes
are denied compensation.
There are no fixed standards or yard sticks to measure the
amount to be allowed, but each applicant must rely upon the
merits of his position and his services. Certain principles have
been enunciated that govern to a limited extent. Some of the
elements or factors that have been taken into consideration are:
(a) the time basis; (b) the salary basis; (c) territorial locations
as affecting the "cost of doing business"; (d) the magnitude
of the task as it may absorb personnel and office facilities; (e)
the results obtained, and what particular applicants brought the
particular results; (f) comparison with usual allowances for
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similar work requiring equivalent skill and experience; (g) dif-
ficulties, complexities, novelty of questions presented, size of
estate, and amount involved. Hence, the amounts allowed to the
various parties representing the several interests in the reported
cases do not establish absolute criteria for allowances in other
cases.
The 75th Congress passed an act prohibiting parties from mak-
ing agreements as to fees in receivership and reorganization
cases." The application of the Act is limited, however, to such
fees as are to come out of the estate or the reorganization fund. 5
ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY
It is apparent that the attorney working in bankruptcy reorgan-
ization is no longer a mere undertaker; he is a doctor. Much of
the success of the proceeding depends on the ability, standing,
and character of the attorney representing major interests. The
problems of reorganization involve questions of law, finance,
corporate management, and even public relations. While the
proceeding is largely administrative, every case involves various
purely legal questions reaching into many fields of the law. It is,
however, in truth a proceeding, and not a law suit where one
person is a party litigant in control of the evidence which he
wishes to introduce.
The attorney is usually obliged to do most of the work though
he may be representing court officers or a committee or the
debtor or some other interest. Unfortunately he also bears the
brunt of the criticism for which there now seems to be an open
season on lawyers. Yet he has also the opportunity to initiate
the policies of administration as well as to carry them through.
He may direct the activities of committees and other lay repre-
sentatives of the parties in interest.
The profession has in this field of statutory reorganization all
opportunity for a great service in the establishment of our
economic system on a sounder basis, while at the same time
curing many ills of the excesses of the past. It is a field of en-
deavor that calls for ingenuity and imagination, skill and knowl-
edge, and should provide satisfaction to the legal mind.
64 28 U. S. C. A. §572(a).
65 In re Trans-State Oil Co., 24 F. Supp. 454 (1938).
